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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a symposium celebrating the career and contributions of Professor 
D. Michael Risinger, it seems appropriate to discuss an issue he has 
considered and commented upon for many years—the challenge of 
communicating forensic science findings to ordinary human beings, such as 
those who serve on juries.1  I will focus on source conclusions, which are the 
conclusions that forensic scientists reach after comparing items to evaluate 
whether they have, or might have, a common source.  Examples include 
comparison of fingerprints, biological samples, tool marks, shoe prints, and 
handwriting. 
The question I will address is how forensic scientists should 
communicate source conclusions in reports and testimony.  The answer, I 
will argue, depends on two issues: (1) what conclusions can be justified 
logically and empirically;2 and (2) what conclusions (among those that can 
be justified logically and empirically) are most likely to be understood and 
used appropriately.  I will first review various possible ways that forensic 
scientists might report source conclusions, pointing out logical and empirical 
difficulties with some reporting methods.  Then I will discuss what is 
currently known about lay understanding of such reports. 
This analysis will, unfortunately, yield no ideal or preferred solution.  
It will instead suggest that the legal system faces trade-offs: the reporting 
formats that are easiest for lay people to understand are difficult to justify 
logically and empirically, while reporting formats that are easier to justify 
logically and empirically are more difficult for lay people to understand.  To 
find the best solution, I will argue, we need careful consideration of the 





 1  Examples of Risinger’s commentary on this topic include D. Michael Risinger, 
Reservations About Likelihood Ratios (and Some Other Aspects of Forensic ‘Bayesianism,’ 
12 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 63 (2012); D. Michael Risinger, Against Symbolization, 11 
LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 247 (2012).   
 2  There is wide agreement (I hope) that forensic scientists should be limited to 
presenting conclusions that are scientifically valid.  That is the essence of Rule 702 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert standard.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).   
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II. THE LOGIC OF SOURCE CONCLUSIONS 
Let’s begin by considering the logic of forensic comparison—that is, 
the logical steps by which a forensic examiner may go from observations 
about the physical characteristics of a pair of items to a conclusion about 
whether the items have a common source.  I will use fingerprint comparison 
as an illustration because fingerprints are easy to understand and because the 
logic of drawing conclusions from a fingerprint comparison is essentially 
same as the logic of drawing conclusions from the comparison of other items, 
such as footwear impressions, tool marks, bite marks, handwriting, and the 
like. 
The examiner’s goal is generally to assess two alternative hypotheses 
about the origin of the prints being compared: (1) that the prints came from 
the same finger; and (2) that the prints came from different fingers.  
Examiners make this assessment based on the observed physical 
characteristics of the prints, focusing particularly on similarities and 
differences between the ridge patterns.  The analysis is inherently 
probabilistic; the only logical way for an examiner to derive source 
conclusions is to consider the probability of the observed patterns under the 
alternative hypotheses about their origin.3 
Suppose that the ridge patterns of the two fingerprints appear quite 
similar, but the examiner observes some small discrepancies.  The examiner 
must consider how likely those discrepancies are if the prints were made by 
the same finger.  This might involve consideration of the likelihood that 
slipping or torsion of the finger, or some other process, could have distorted 
one or both of the prints enough to produce the discrepancies.  The examiner 
must also consider the likelihood that the patterns would be as similar if the 
prints were made by different fingers, which would require consideration of 
the rarity of the shared features.4 
 
 3  Latent print examiners have only recently begun to recognize and acknowledge the 
probabilistic nature of their analyses.  Heidi Eldridge, The Shifting Landscape of Latent Print 
Testimony: An American Perspective, 3. J. FORENSIC SCI. & MED. 72 (2017).  In the past, it 
was common for them to claim they were simply determining whether the ridge patterns 
“match” or share unique features.  Simon A. Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness, 
Conclusions Without Individualization: The New Epistemology of Forensic Identification, 8 
LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 233 (2009); Simon A. Cole, Individualization is Dead, Long Live 
Individualization! Reforms of Reporting Practices for Fingerprint Analysis in the United 
States, 13 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 117 (2014).  Whether they recognize it or not, this 
determination requires them to think about the probability that any discrepancies between the 
prints could have arisen if the prints came from the same finger, and the probability that the 
similarities between the prints could have arisen if the prints were from different fingers.   
 4  For a detailed discussion and analysis of latent print examination, see William 
Thompson, John Black, Anil Jain & Joseph Kadane, Forensic Science Assessments: A Quality 
and Gap Analysis—Latent Fingerprint Examination, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
SCI. (Sept. 2017), https://mcmprodaaas.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/reports/Latent%20Fi
ngerprint%20Report%20FINAL%209_14.pdf?i9xGS_EyMHnIPLG6INIUyZb66L5cLdlb 
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It is the balance between these two likelihoods that allows inferences to 
be drawn about whether the traces have a common source.  The observed 
results support the hypothesis of a common source to the extent that the 
likelihood of the observed features is higher if the traces have a common 
source than if they have a different source.  The observed results support the 
hypothesis of a different source to the extent that the likelihood of the 
observed features is higher if the traces have a different source than if they 
have a common source.  That is the fundamental and inescapable logic of 
forensic comparison; it applies regardless of how examiners choose to report 
their conclusions, although some reporting methods do a better job than 
others of making this logic transparent.5 
III. POSSIBLE FORMATS FOR REPORTING 
There are (at least) three schools of thought on how examiners should 
report their conclusions.  One approach requires the examiner to make 
statements reflecting the balance of likelihoods. The examiner either makes 
a statement about the relative likelihood of the observed findings under 
alternative hypotheses or makes a statement about the strength of the forensic 
evidence that is based on the balance of likelihoods.6  I will discuss variants 
on this first approach to reporting in Part A. 
A second approach, more common in the United States, requires a two-
step analysis.  First, the examiner compares the items, looking for 
distinguishing features that would rule out the hypothesis that the items have 
a common source.7  When distinguishing features are found, the examiner 
 
[hereinafter AAAS REPORT]. 
 5  More complete discussions of the logic of forensic inference can be found in BERNARD 
ROBERTSON, G.A. VIGNAUX & CHARLES E.H. BERGER, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE: EVALUATING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (2d ed. 2016); COLIN AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI, 
STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS (2d ed. 2004); 
COLIN AITKEN, PAUL ROBERTS & GRAHAM JACKSON, COMMUNICATING AND INTERPRETING 
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 1. FUNDAMENTALS OF 
PROBABILITY AND STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (2010), http://www.rss.
org.uk/Images/PDF/influencing-change/rss-fundamentals-probability-statistical-evidence.pd
f.   
 6  See ROBERTSON, VIGNAUX & BERGER, supra note 5; John Buckleton, A Framework 
For Interpreting Evidence, in JOHN S. BUCKLETON, CHRIS M. TRIGGS & SIMON J. WALSH, 
FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE INTERPRETATION 27–63 (2005); Geoffrey Stewart Morrison, The 
Likelihood-Ratio Framework and Forensic Evidence in Court: A Response to R v T., 15 INT’L 
J. OF EVID. & PROOF 1–29 (2012); Graham Jackson, Understanding Forensic Science 
Opinions, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 419–45 (Jim Fraser & Robin Williams eds., 
2009).   
 7  Whether the hypothesis of common source can be ruled out is a decision made by the 
examiner based on an assessment of the probability that the observed discrepancies would 
occur if the items being compared have the same source.  When the probability of the observed 
discrepancies is sufficiently low, the examiner decides, in effect, to reject the hypothesis of a 
common source and accept the hypothesis of a different source.  There typically are no 
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reports that the items do not have a common source—which is often called 
“exclusion.”  When the items cannot be distinguished (i.e., the hypothesis of 
common source cannot be ruled out), then, as a second step, the examiner 
makes an assessment of the rarity or distinctiveness of the shared features.  
If the examiner believes the shared features are so distinctive as to be unique 
(one-of-a-kind), the examiner may conclude (and report) that the items have 
a common source—this conclusion is often called an individualization or 
identification.8  If the examiner believes the shared features are not unique, 
then several options exist.  The examiner may make a statement about the 
rarity of the matching features, or the probability that a random item of the 
same type would have such features.  Alternatively, the examiner might 
simply report that the items are indistinguishable, or that they “match,” 
without commenting on the rarity of the matching features.  Finally, the 
examiner might report that the comparison was inconclusive. I will discuss 
variants on this two-step approach in Part B. 
A third approach requires the examiner to draw conclusions about the 
probability that the items have a common source, which can be expressed 
either with numbers (e.g., “there is a 99% chance this bite mark was made 
by the suspect”) or with words (e.g., “it is highly probable that these marks 
were made by the same tool”).  These conclusions are sometimes called 
source probabilities.  A distinctive feature of this third approach, which 
distinguishes it from both the first approach (balance of likelihoods) and the 
second approach (two-step analysis), is that it requires the examiner to take 
a position or make assumptions about the prior odds that the items being 
compared have a common source.9  In other words, the examiner’s 
conclusion necessarily rests on something more than an evaluation of the 
physical properties of the items being compared.  I will discuss variants of 








objective standards either for the estimation of probability or for the threshold of decision; 
both are subjective judgments.   
 8  Eldridge, supra note 3; AAAS report, supra note 4. 
 9  See Jackson, supra note 6, at 426–27.   
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A. Statements About the Balance of Likelihoods 
1. Likelihood Ratios (LRs) 
In Europe, forensic examiners often describe their perception of the 
balance of likelihoods using numbers called likelihood ratios (LRs).10  LRs 
represent the expert’s view of the relative probability of the observed 
features under the alternative hypotheses about the source of the traces.11 
LRs are commonly used in the United States to report the results of 
comparisons involving mixed DNA samples.12  The analyst might report, for 
example, that the genetic characteristics found in a mixed specimen are “X 
times more likely” under one assumed hypothesis (e.g., “the specimen 
consists of DNA from the suspect and an unknown person”) than under an 
alternative hypothesis (e.g., “the specimen consists of DNA from two 
unknown persons”).13  LRs have also been used to characterize the strength 
of forensic voice comparison evidence.14 
Forensic DNA analysts and forensic voice comparison analysts can 
compute LRs based on databases and statistical models.  In many fields of 
forensic science, however, the empirical foundation for such estimates is 
more limited.  There are relatively few studies of the frequency of various 
features of fingerprints, tool marks, bite marks, handwriting, footwear 
impressions and the like.15  Furthermore, it is often difficult to model the 
 
 10  EUROPEAN NETWORK OF FORENSIC SCI. INSTS., ENFSI GUIDELINE FOR EVALUATIVE 
REPORTING IN FORENSIC SCIENCE: STRENGTHENING THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC RESULTS 
ACROSS EUROPE (2015), http://enfsi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/m1_guideline.pdf 
[hereinafter ENFSI REPORT]; Wim Kerkhoff, Reinoud Stoel, Erwin Mattijssen & Rob 
Hermsen, The Likelihood Ratio Approach in Cartridge and Bullet Comparison, 45 AFTE J. 
284 (2013) (describing the adoption of the LR approach by the firearms section of the 
Netherlands Forensic Institute); Charles E.H. Berger et al., Evidence Evaluation: A Response 
to the Court of Appeal Judgment in R v. T, 51 SCI. & JUST. 43 (2011).   
 11  There is a simple mathematical description of the LR that lawyers and judges may 
encounter when reviewing forensic evidence.  Let E represent the observed features of two 
traces that a forensic scientist is asked to compare; let Hs represent the hypothesis that the 
items have the same source and Hd the hypothesis that they have a different source.  The 
likelihood ratio is then p(E|Hs)/p(E|Hd), which is read as “the probability of E given Hs over 
the probability of E given Hd.”   
 12  JOHN BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF 
STR MARKERS ch. 22 (2d ed. 2005).   
 13  The LR for a particular comparison is the examiner’s estimate of p(E|Hs)/ p(E|Hd).   
 14  Geoffrey Stewart Morrison & William C. Thompson, Assessing the Admissibility of a 
New Generation of Forensic Voice Comparison Testimony, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 
326 (2017), http://www.stlr.org/download/volumes/volume18/morrisonThompson.pdf.   
 15  See generally NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7 (2009), https://www.ncjrs
.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf [hereinafter NAS REPORT); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF 
ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC 
VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov
/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf 
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probability of obtaining specific sets of features because the individual 
features are not necessarily statistically independent.16  Examiners in these 
fields nevertheless make judgments about the probability of observing 
particular sets of features under alternative hypotheses.  Rather than relying 
on empirical data and statistical modeling, however, they typically make a 
subjective evaluation based on their training and experience.  In some 
instances, they can rely partly on empirical data and partly on training and 
experience.17 
The European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) has 
recommended that forensic examiners always use likelihood ratios to 
evaluate and describe the strength of source conclusions, even if examiners 
must make subjective judgments about the relevant likelihoods.18  While 
some commentators (most notably Professor Risinger) have expressed 
reservations about presenting LRs derived from subjective evaluations rather 
than empirical data,19 the practice of presenting subjective likelihood ratios 
appears to have taken hold in many European countries.20 
Advocates of subjective LRs point out that a forensic examiner must 
make subjective evaluations of likelihood in order to draw any conclusions 
about whether two items have a common source.21  If the examiner is unable 
to assess the relevant likelihoods, then the examiner has no basis for 
evaluating the strength of the forensic evidence—and hence, should not be 
reporting source conclusions at all.  Asking examiners to report LRs is 
simply asking them to use numbers to describe their subjective beliefs about 
the relevant likelihoods.  By making these beliefs explicit, examiners 
increase the transparency of their inferential process, making it easier for 
those who rely on their conclusions to evaluate and appreciate potential 
weaknesses in the examiner’s logic or in the scientific foundations for the 
 
[hereinafter PCAST REPORT].   
 16  See, e.g., AAAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 21–22 (citations omitted), which notes: “The 
probability of finding a set of genetic features in a DNA test is relatively easy to estimate 
because the features occur at rates that are statistically independent of one another. Statistical 
dependencies are more likely for fingerprint features and will make it far more difficult to 
estimate the frequency of combinations of features for fingerprints than for DNA profiles. 
Consequently, research of this type, while important, is unlikely to yield quick answers.”   
 17  See, e.g., Alex Biedermann, Franco Taroni & Christophe Champod, How to Assign a 
Likelihood Ratio in a Footwear Mark Case: An Analysis and Discussion in Light of R v. T.  
11 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 259 (2012).   
 18  ENFSI REPORT, supra note 10.   
 19  See Risinger, Reservations About LRs, supra note 1 (calling subjective LRs “numbers 
from nowhere”).   
 20  Berger et al., supra note 1010; ENFSI REPORT, supra note 10.   
 21  Marjan J. Sjerps & Charles E.H. Berger, How Clear Is Transparent? Reporting Expert 
Reasoning in Legal Cases, 11 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 317 (2012), https://academic.oup.c
om/lpr/article-pdf/11/4/317/2748435/mgs017.pdf.   
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examiner’s conclusion.22 
On the other hand, examiners may be reluctant to put specific numbers 
on their subjective beliefs about the relevant likelihoods, even if those beliefs 
are well-grounded.  An examiner may justifiably believe that the observed 
results are far more probable if the items being compared have the same 
source than a different source, for example, without being able to say with 
any precision how much more probable. Forcing examiners to articulate 
numbers may lend a false air of precision to a subjective approximation.23 
One way to deal with this problem is to allow examiners to express 
conclusions about the balance of likelihoods using words rather than 
numbers.  In 2012, the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent 
Print Analysis, sponsored by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), issued an important and carefully reasoned report that 
suggested that latent print examiners avoid claiming they can link a latent 
print to a single possible finger and instead make statements like the 
following: “[I]t is far more probable that this degree of similarity would 
occur when comparing the latent print with the defendant’s fingers than with 
someone else’s fingers.24“  This is an imprecise verbal characterization of a 
likelihood ratio designed to convey the examiner’s opinion that the balance 
of likelihoods strongly favors the hypothesis of same-source. 
Statements of this type may be easier to defend than seemingly precise 
numerical LRs.  An examiner who says the observed results are at least 
10,000 times more likely if the prints were made by the same finger than 
different fingers is likely to face skeptical questions about the basis for that 
number, while a claim like “far more probable” may be more readily 
accepted.  Of course the problem of unwarranted precision is evaded at the 
cost of imprecision, and perhaps obfuscation.  Does “far more probable” 
mean 10 times more likely, 100 times more likely, 1000 times more likely, 
10,000 times more likely?  Without quantification, the meaning of such 
phrases can be unclear.  Moreover, vague terminology may help examiners 
evade legitimate questions about how accurately they can judge the relevant 
probabilities, thereby obscuring the shaky scientific foundation for these 
 
 22  See Sjerps & Berger, supra note 21; Biederman, Taroni & Champod, supra note 17; 
William C. Thompson, Hard Cases Make Bad Law: Reactions to R v. T., 11 LAW, 
PROBABILITY & RISK 347 (2012), https://academic.oup.com/lpr/article-pdf/11/4/347/2748
692/mgs020.pdf.   
 23  See Risinger, Reservations, supra note 1, at 72 (“[T]here is something about the 
generation of likelihood ratios with numbers from nowhere that tends to cover up the 
weakness of the ingredients.”).   
 24  EXPERT WORKING GRP. ON HUMAN FACTORS IN LATENT PRINT ANALYSIS, NAT’L INST. 
OF STANDARDS & TECH., LATENT PRINT EXAMINATION AND HUMAN FACTORS: IMPROVING THE 
PRACTICE THROUGH A SYSTEMS APPROACH 134 (2012) ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pd
f.cfm?pub_id=910745.   
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judgments.25 
2. Strength-of-Support Statements 
LRs suffer the disadvantage of being difficult for lay people to 
understand.26  As discussed later in this Article, people often mistakenly 
believe LRs are a statement about the probability that a particular hypothesis 
is true, rather than about the strength of the evidence for supporting a 
particular hypothesis.27 
One way to clarify the meaning of LRs is to translate them into a verbal 
statement about the strength of the evidence for supporting a particular 
hypothesis.  An interesting example is the proposal of the United Kingdom-
based Association of Forensic Science Providers (AFSP)28 that forensic 
scientists use the “verbal expressions” shown in Table 1 as a means of 
explaining LRs in reports and testimony: 
 
Table 1. Recommended Likelihood Ratio Terminology (AFSP, 2009) 
 
Likelihood Ratio Verbal Expression (Strength of Support) 
1–10 Weak or limited support 
10–100 Moderate support 
100–1,000 Moderately strong support 
1000–10,000 Strong support 
10,000–1,000,000 Very strong support 
>1,000,000 Extremely strong support 
 
 25  What Professor Risinger, supra note 23, called “the weakness of the ingredients” may 
be covered up as effectively by vague terminology as by subjectively generated numbers.   
 26  See Kristy A. Martire, Richard I. Kemp, Ian Watkins, Malindi A. Sayle & Ben R. 
Newell, The Expression and Interpretation of Uncertain Forensic Science Evidence: Verbal 
Equivalence, Evidence Strength, and the Weak Evidence Effect, 37 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 197 
(2013), http://www2.psy.unsw.edu.au/users/bnewell/MKWSN2013.pdf; William C. 
Thompson & Eryn J. Newman, Lay Understanding of Forensic Statistics: Evaluation of 
Random Match Probabilities, Likelihood Ratios, and Verbal Equivalents, 39 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 332 (2015); Barbara A. Spellman, Alternative Suggestions for Communicating 
Forensic Evidence, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 827.  The question of how well lay people 
understand LRs is discussed in more detail later in this article.   
 27  Thompson & Newman, supra note 26; William C. Thompson, Suzanne O. Kaasa & 
Tiamoyo Peterson, Do Jurors Give Appropriate Weight to Forensic Identification Evidence?, 
10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 359 (2013).   
 28  Ass’n of Forensic Sci. Providers, Standards for the Formulation of Evaluative 
Forensic Science Expert Opinion, 49 SCI. & JUST. J. 161 (2009) [hereinafter AFSP Standards].   
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Table 1 shows a range of verbal expressions designed to be presented 
in place of (or along with) numerical LRs.  For example, a forensic scientist 
who determines (by whatever means) that the results observed in a forensic 
comparison are 500 times more probable if the items have a common source 
than if they have a different source would report that the comparison 
provides “moderately strong” support for the conclusion that the items have 
a common source. 
The strength-of-support statements recommended by the AFSP were 
not derived from empirical research; they simply reflect the best judgment 
of that association as to the kind of reporting statements that will be correctly 
understood by a lay audience.  Later in this Article, I will discuss some recent 
empirical research that casts light on whether lay people perceive these 
statements to be as strong as the corresponding LRs. 
B. Statements Based on a Two-Step Analysis 
In a two-step analysis, the examiner first compares the items, looking 
for distinguishing features that rule out the hypothesis that the items have a 
common source.  If no distinguishing features are found, the examiner then 
considers the rarity or distinctiveness of the shared features, which can lead 
to several different conclusions. 
1. Identification/Individualization Based on Uniqueness of 
Features 
When examiners determine that the features shared by the items are 
unique or one-of-a-kind, they may conclude, on that basis, that the two items 
must have a common source.  This conclusion is often called an 
identification or individualization.  In the United States latent print 
examiners have traditionally limited themselves to reporting one of three 
possible conclusions: that the prints being compared were made by the same 
finger (identification/individualization), or that they were made by different 
fingers (exclusion), or that the results of the comparison are inconclusive.29  
In other pattern-matching disciplines, examiners are allowed to reach a 
broader array of possible conclusions, but identification/individualization 
based on uniqueness of features is among the conclusions that examiners 
sometimes report.30 
 
 29  See supra note 3.   
 30  See the reporting standards for latent print examination, Guideline for the Articulation 
of the Decision Making Process for Individualization in Friction Ridge Examination, SCI. 
WORKING GRP. ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS, STUDY & TECH. (Mar. 13, 2013), clpex.c
om/swgfast/documents/articulation/130427_Articulation_1.0.pdf; tool mark examination, 
Ass’n of Firearms & Tool Mark Examiners, Theory of Identification, AFTE J. (1992), 
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The scientific basis for identification/individualization is weak.  A 
number of commentators have questioned whether forensic scientists can 
accurately determine whether the features they examine are unique.31  In 
2009, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) declared in an authoritative 
report about the state of forensic science: “With the exception of nuclear 
DNA analysis, however, no forensic method has been rigorously shown to 
have the capacity to consistently and with a high degree of certainty, 
demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or 
source.”32  Ironically, DNA analysts typically report findings using 
likelihood ratios or match probabilities; “identifications” are most likely to 
be made in the very disciplines for which NAS found insufficient proof of a 
capacity to connect evidence to a specific individual or source.  The NAS 
report called on forensic scientists to stop claiming that they can uniquely 
identify the source of an item, saying “the concept of ‘uniquely associated 
with’ must be replaced with a probabilistic association . . . .”33 
Even for fingerprints, which are sometimes thought to be unique, it is 
problematic for forensic examiners to claim they can identify individuals on 
that basis.  A 2017 American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS) report on latent print examination explained the matter as follows: 
 
Even if the ridge detail of every finger were unique and 
unchangeable, it does not follow that every impression made by 
every finger will always be distinguishable from every impression 
made by any other finger, particularly if the impressions are of 
poor quality (e.g., limited detail, smudged, distorted, overlaid on 
another impression).  By analogy, it may be that every human face 
is unique, but we can still mistake one person for another, 
particularly when comparing poor-quality photos.34 
 
 
https://afte.org/about-us/what-is-afte/afte-theory-of-identification; Ronald G. Nichols, 
Defending the Scientific Foundations of the Firearms and Tool Mark Identification 
Discipline: Responding to Recent Challenges, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 586 (2007); document 
examination, SWGDOC Standard Terminology for Expressing Conclusions of Forensic 
Document Examiners, SCI. WORKING GRP. FOR FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION (Jan. 
2015), http://www.swgdoc.org/index.php/standards/published-standards; footwear 
examination, SCI. WORKING GRP. FOR SHOEPRINT & TIRE TREAD EVID., Range of Conclusions 
Standard for Footwear and Tire Impression Examinations (Mar. 2013), https://www.swgtre
ad.org/images/documents/standards/published/swgtread_10_conclusions_range_201303.pdf.   
 31  See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic 
Identification Science, 309 SCI. 892 (2005); Cole (2009); Cole (2014), supra note 3; Jonathan 
J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in Forensic Science: Still 
Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1187 (2010).   
 32  NAS REPORT, supra note 15, at 7.   
 33  Id. at 184.   
 34  AAAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.   
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Based on a comprehensive review of the scientific literature on latent 
print examination, the AAAS’s report concluded that a sufficient scientific 
basis did not exist for the claim that latent print examiners can “identify” or 
“individualize” a latent print: 
 
Examiners may well be able to exclude the preponderance of the 
human population as possible sources of a latent print, but there is 
no scientific basis for estimating the number of people who could 
not be excluded and there are no scientific criteria for determining 
when the pool of possible sources is limited to a single person.35 
 
The same problem arises in other forensic disciplines where examiners 
claim to be able to identify the source of an item based on the uniqueness of 
its features.  Indeed, most of the pattern-matching disciplines have a weaker 
scientific foundation than latent print examination; less is known about the 
rarity of the features sets evaluated by examiners, and less is known about 
the accuracy of examiners’ conclusions.36 
2. Match Frequencies/Random Match Probabilities (RMPs) 
After comparing items and finding no distinguishing features, 
examiners following a two-step analysis sometimes report that the items are 
indistinguishable, and then, to explain the probative value of this finding, 
provide estimates of how frequently indistinguishable items would be found 
in a reference population.  This occurs most commonly in forensic DNA 
analysis, where genetic databases provide an empirical basis for estimating 
the frequency of DNA profiles in various human populations.  Forensic DNA 
analysts sometimes present these estimates as match frequencies—e.g., “The 
blood stain at the crime scene and the reference blood sample from the 
suspect have the same DNA profile. This DNA profile is estimated to occur 
in 1 in 10 million people among Caucasian-Americans.”  Alternatively, they 
may present these estimates as random match probabilities (RMPs)—e.g., 
“The defendant could not be excluded as a possible contributor to the DNA 
in the crime scene sample.  The probability that a random Caucasian-
American would fail to be excluded as a possible contributor is 0.0000001 
or 1 in 10 million.”37  While experts could in principle use numbers to report 
their subjective beliefs about the match probability, I am not aware of any 
cases in which forensic examiners have done that.  When numbers are 
 
 35  Id. at 5.  The 2012 report of the NIST Expert Working Group, supra note 24, reached 
the same conclusion.   
 36  See generally PCAST REPORT, supra note 15.   
 37  See Butler, supra note 12.   
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reported, they are always derived from databases and statistical models. 
Estimates based on empirical data and statistical models are far easier 
to defend on scientific grounds than assertions about the uniqueness of 
features or subjective estimates of the match probability.  Questions can, of 
course, be raised about whether the statistical models underlying the 
estimates are appropriate and whether the databases represent relevant 
reference populations.38 When relevant data are available, however, 
empirically-based estimates of match frequency are undoubtedly preferable 
to subjective evaluations based on experts’ training and experience.  The 
major barrier to wider use of this reporting method, as noted earlier, is that 
most forensic disciplines do not have adequate databases from which to 
make such estimates, and that statistical modeling may be complicated by 
the lack of statistical independence of critical features observed when 
making comparisons. 
One limitation of this reporting method is that RMPs do not always 
provide a complete account of the probative value of a forensic comparison.  
RMPs do not take account of discrepancies between the items being 
compared that may be too minor to justify exclusion but may nevertheless 
undermine the probative value of the comparison, such as discrepancies 
between fingerprints that may have arisen from distortion, or discrepancies 
between DNA profiles that could have arisen from degradation or allelic 
drop-out.39  In such instances, it may be better to report results using LRs 
because match frequencies/RMPs provide an incomplete and potentially 
 
 38  For a general discussion of uncertainty and assumptions in modeling, see Steven P. 
Lund & Hari Iyer, Likelihood Ratio as Weight of Forensic Evidence: A Closer Look,  122 J. 
RES. NATL. INST. STAND. & TECH. 1 (2017); https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.122.027.  For a 
discussion of modeling assumptions and relevant reference populations in the field of forensic 
voice comparison, see Morrison & Thompson, supra note 14; for a discussion of similar issues 
in forensic DNA analysis, see DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
(2010); William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification 
Tests: Lessons From the “DNA War,” 84 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1993).   
 39  The problem can be understood most easily by comparing a match frequency with a 
LR.  The LR takes into account two probabilities: (1) the probability of the observed findings 
if the items have the same source; and (2) the probability of the observed findings if the items 
have a different source.  Match frequencies/RMPs are statements only about the second 
probability (2).  In some cases, the second probability is all that needs to be considered.  If 
the observed findings were certain to be found if the items have a common source, i.e., 
p(E|Hs)=1.0, then all one need consider (to evaluate the strength of the evidence) is the 
probability of the observed findings if the items have a different source.  In such cases, the 
match frequency or RMP is the complement of the LR and conveys the same information.  
For example, a random match probability of 1 in 100 would be equivalent in strength to an 
LR of 100.  Problems arise, however, when the features observed when making a particular 
comparison are ones that are not certain to be observed if the items have the same source, i.e., 
p(E|Hs)<1.0.  This can occur when there are discrepancies between the items that make the 
observed findings unlikely, but not impossible, under the hypothesis that there is a common 
source.   
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misleading account of the strength of the forensic comparison.40 
3. Likelihood of Observed Correspondence 
Some laboratories have opted to make qualitative statements about the 
likelihood that the observed correspondence between the items could arise 
randomly if the items do not have a common source.  In other words, they 
make verbal statements about the match frequency/RMPs, which may rest in 
whole or in part on an examiner’s subjective judgment.41  For example, in 
2015, the Defense Forensic Science Center (DFSC) of the Department of the 
Army adopted the following reporting statement for positive latent print 
comparisons: “The latent print on Exhibit ## and the record finger/palm 
prints bearing the name XXXX have corresponding ridge detail.  The 
likelihood of observing this amount of correspondence when two 
impressions are made by different sources is considered extremely low.”42 
This statement is similar to the verbal statement about relative 
likelihood recommended by the NIST Expert Working Group (as discussed 
previously).  The difference is that the Army statement addresses only the 
likelihood of the observed pattern under the hypothesis of different source—
that is, it speaks only to the denominator of the likelihood ratio.  In cases 
where the likelihood of the observed evidence under the same-source 
hypothesis is high, there may be little conceptual difference between the 
Army statement and the NIST Expert Working Group statement, but the 
Army approach could be misleading in cases where the numerator of the LRs 
may be significantly less than one.43  This could arise where, for example, 
two prints appear to share a distinctive set of features but also have 







 40  See James M. Curran & John Buckleton, Inclusion Probabilities and Dropout, 55 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 1171–73 (2010) (discussing this issue in connection with forensic DNA 
evidence); Morrison & Thompson, supra note 14, at 358–60 (discussing this issue in 
connection with forensic voice comparison evidence).   
 41  These can be viewed as verbal statements of the examiner’s beliefs about the 
likelihood p(E|Hd).   
 42  DEPT. OF THE ARMY DEFENSE FORENSIC SCI. CTR., INFORMATION PAPER RE: USE OF 
THE TERM “IDENTIFICATION” IN LATENT PRINT TECHNICAL REPORTS 1 (2015), http://onin.com/
fp/DFSC_LP_Information_Paper_Nov_2015.pdf.   
 43  See supra note 39 and accompanying text.   
 44  I offer further comments on the Army reporting statement in the concluding section of 
this Article.   
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4. Matches/Correspondence Without Frequencies or 
Probabilities 
Examiners sometimes report that they have compared items and found 
them to be indistinguishable without providing information about the rarity 
of the matching features or the probability of a random match.  The examiner 
might simply report that the items are “indistinguishable,” that they “match,” 
or “correspond,” that one “cannot be excluded” from having the same source 
as another, or similar language.45  Reports of this type are typically offered 
when the examiner is uncertain about the rarity of the shared features, or 
thinks the shared features are not particularly rare. 
The problem with this approach is that it provides no meaningful 
information about the probative value of the forensic evidence, and may 
imply more than the examiner intends: 
 
. . . recipients of an opinion expressed as a ‘match’ may translate 
that into meaning that the two ‘matching’ samples share the same 
origin.  This would be different from the meaning that the scientist 
would want to convey, namely that the samples share the same 
attributes.  So, even when scientists and laypeople use the same 
word, the meaning to these two sets of people can be quite 
different.46 
 
Furthermore, even if the examiner clarifies that match means same 
attributes rather than same source, the meaning of the “match” remains 
unclear in the absence of information about the likelihood of observing those 
attributes under alternative propositions about whether the items have a 
common source.  The probative value of the evidence is a matter about which 
recipients must guess based on whatever knowledge or preconceptions they 
have about the evidence in question.47 
5. True and False Positive Rates 
In 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (PCAST) issued an important report titled “Forensic Science in 
Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison 
Methods.”48  The PCAST report sets forth in considerable detail what is 
required to establish the validity of a method for assessing whether two 
items, such as fingerprints or tool marks, have a common source based on a 
 
 45  See Jackson, supra note 6, for a more complete account of terminology of this type.   
 46  Id. at 422.   
 47  Lay reactions to such testimony are discussed later in this Article.  See infra note 78, 
and accompanying text.   
 48  PCAST REPORT, supra note 15.   
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comparison of their features.  It emphasized the need for empirical testing to 
establish the accuracy of each method: “Without appropriate estimates of 
accuracy, an examiner’s statement that two samples are similar—or even 
indistinguishable—is scientifically meaningless: it has no probative value, 
and considerable potential for prejudicial impact. Nothing—not training, 
personal experience nor professional practices—can substitute for adequate 
empirical demonstration of accuracy.”49 
PCAST recommended that forensic examiners disclose the error rates 
observed in black-box validation studies on the method in question when 
they report and testify about forensic comparisons.50  Under this approach, 
error rate data become an integral part of forensic science reporting, allowing 
the trier of fact better insight into the probative value of the expert’s 
conclusion.  When reporting an identification or exclusion, the examiner also 
reports the rate of false identifications and false exclusion that have occurred 
in validation studies of the method in question.  This changes the nature of 
the examiner’s report from an unqualified statement that the items have the 
same source (or a different source) to a statement that the examiner has made 
a determination that is related probabilistically to whether the items have the 
same source.  This shift in reporting makes the examiner’s conclusion easier 
to justify logically and empirically, but may make the report more difficult 
for recipients to understand and evaluate. 
The PCAST report operated on the assumption that forensic scientists 
will report categorically—that is, the examiner, after comparing items, will 
report one of a limited number of conclusions, e.g., “identification,” 
“exclusion,” or “inconclusive.”  It is fairly easy to establish hit rates and false 
positive rates when experts use a limited number of reporting categories.  
Error rates are more difficult to evaluate when experts use continuous scales 
(e.g., LRs or source probabilities), although with enough data it is possible 
to establish the relationship between the numbers expert’s report and ground 
truth.51  One might calculate, for example, how much more likely experts are 
 
 49  Id. at 46.   
 50  Black-box studies are designed to test examiners’ accuracy when comparing items 
known (to researchers, but not examiners) to have the same source, or to have a different 
source.  The goal of these studies is to determine how often examiners correctly and 
incorrectly determine the source of the items they are asked to compare.  Ideally these studies 
require examiners to evaluate items that are comparable to the items encountered in casework 
following procedures that are as similar as possible to those used in casework.  Id. at 66.  See 
also AAAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 43–51 (discussing ways to conduct empirical studies on 
the accuracy of latent print examination).   
 51  For further discussion of the validation of likelihood ratios, see Geoffrey Stewart 
Morrison, Measuring the Validity and Reliability of Forensic Likelihood-Ratio Systems, 51 
SCI. & JUST. 91 (2011), and Didier Meuwly, Daniel Ramos & Rudolf Haraksim, A Guideline 
For the Validation of Likelihood Ratio Methods Used For Forensic Evidence Evaluation, 276 
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 142 (2017), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0379073
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to report a LR in a given range (e.g., 10–100) when evaluating same-source 
samples than different-source samples.  Research of this type would be 
helpful for determining whether LR estimates are well-calibrated and for 
identifying weaknesses in LR-based methods, although results of this type 
will undoubtedly be more difficult to explain to juries than hit rates and false 
positive rates for a categorical reporting system. 
C. Statements Based, in Part, on Prior Odds of a Common Source 
One virtue of the reporting methods discussed thus far is that examiners 
can reach the reported conclusions by examining and comparing the items in 
question without giving any consideration to other evidence in the case.  For 
example, a latent print examiner can reach conclusions based on an 
evaluation of the ridge patterns and other features of the prints being 
compared.  The examiner need not consider any other evidence (e.g., DNA 
test results; investigative facts; witness statements; suspect’s alibi) that bears 
on the claim that the prints have a common source.  These approaches are 
therefore consistent with a recommendation of the National Commission on 
Forensic Science that forensic scientists avoid being influenced by “task-
irrelevant” information.52  According to the National Commission, forensic 
scientists should draw source conclusions by considering the physical 
properties of the items being compared and any information needed to 
evaluate likelihood of observing those properties under relevant hypotheses 
about the source of the items.  The Commission offered persuasive reasons 
why forensic scientists should not consider other information about the case, 
even if that information can be used to draw inferences about whether the 
items have a common source.  For example, information that a suspect 
confessed to touching an item might support an inference that a fingerprint 
found on the item is his, but a latent print examiner should not consider that 
information because the examiner is supposed to draw conclusions from an 
examination of the prints, not from other evidence in the case.53 
 
816301359. 
 52  Nat’l Comm. on Forensic Sci., Views of the Commission: Ensuring That Forensic 
Analysis is Based Upon Task-Relevant Information (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.justice.go
v/archives/ncfs/file/818196/download [hereinafter National Commission, 2015].   
 53  For additional discussion of the concept of task-relevance, and of reasons forensic 
scientists should avoid being influenced by task-irrelevant information, see William C. 
Thompson, Determining the Proper Evidentiary Basis for an Expert Opinion: What Do 
Experts Need to Know and When Do They Know Too Much?, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO 
BIAS IN BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE AND THE COURTS: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 133–49 
(Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselheim eds., 2016) [hereafter Thompson, 2016]; 
William C. Thompson, What Role Should Investigative Facts Play in the Evaluation of 
Scientific Evidence?, 43 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC. SCI. 123 (2011); D. Michael Risinger, Michael 
J. Saks, William C. Thompson & Robert Rosental, The Daubert/Kumho Implications of 
Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 
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Despite the Commission’s recommendation, forensic scientists 
sometimes report source conclusions in a way that requires them to evaluate 
or make assumptions about the prior odds that the items being compared 
have a common source.54  These reporting statements require the examiner, 
either implicitly or explicitly, to make assumptions or draw conclusions 
about the strength of the other evidence for supporting the hypotheses of a 
common source.  Because this method of reaching source conclusions differs 
in this important way from both the first approach (balance of likelihoods) 
and the second approach (two-step analysis), I discuss it here as a third major 
approach to reporting.  Using this third approach, examiners can reach two 
kinds of conclusions that are not logically possible under the first two 
approaches. 
1. Statements About Source Probability 
Forensic examiners sometimes offer opinions on the probability that 
two items have a common source.  Opinions of this type can be expressed 
quantitatively, using probabilities or percentages. For example, a forensic 
scientist might say there is a 99% chance that two items have a common 
source.  It is more common, however, for examiners to express such 
conclusions with words rather than numbers.  For example, the forensic 
scientist might say it is “moderately probable;” or “highly probable;” or 
“practically certain” that two items have a common source.55 
A number of commentators have criticized this reporting method on 
grounds that it requires forensic scientists to look beyond the forensic 
evidence and consider (or take positions) on matters beyond their expertise, 
matters that have traditionally been left to the trier-of-fact in criminal cases 
rather than evaluated by experts.56  The simplest way to illustrate this point 
 
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002).   
 54  I borrow the term prior odds from the field of Bayesian statistical inference where it 
is used to refer to an evaluator’s perception of the odds that a hypothesis is true before 
considering a relevant item of evidence.  For example, in a latent print analysis, the prior odds 
would be the examiner’s perception of the odds that the prints in question have a common 
source before conducting the examination of the prints.  Bayesian statistical analysis concerns 
that manner in which an evaluator’s prior odds should be updated in light of new evidence.  
See ROBERTSON, VAGNAUX & BERGER, supra note 5. 
 55  See Jackson, supra note 6.   
 56   After comparing two items, a forensic examiner may be able to estimate the likelihood 
of the observed results under the alternative hypotheses: p(E|Hs) and p(E|Hd).  But these 
likelihoods are not the same as source probabilities; source probabilities are the inverse of 
these conditionals—i.e., p(Hs|E) and p(Hd|E). To infer source probabilities from the 
likelihoods, the examiner must take into account the prior probability that the items have the 
same source, p(Hs), or different source, p(Hd).  According to Bayes’ rule, p(Hs|E)/p(Hd|E) = 
p(Hs)/p(Hd) x p(E|Hs)/ p(E|Hd).  This means that conclusions about source probability cannot 
rest solely on what the examiner observes when making the comparison but must also depend 
on assumptions or conclusions about the a priori probability the items have the same source.  
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is with an example.  Suppose that a DNA analysis shows that a bloodstain 
found at a crime scene has the same DNA profile as a particular suspect.  
How rare would that profile need to be in order for an examiner to conclude 
that it probably came from the suspect?  Suppose, for example, that the DNA 
profile in question would be found in only one person in 1 million in the 
general population.  Would that be rare enough to justify a conclusion that 
the profile probably came from the suspect? 
A moment’s reflection should make it clear that the forensic scientist 
can draw no conclusion about the source probability based solely on the 
information given so far.  To assess source probabilities, the forensic 
scientist must also consider (or make assumptions about) other evidence in 
the case.  Consider that in a nation as large as the United States there are 
likely to be over 300 people who share the one-in-a-million DNA profile 
found in the bloodstain.  If there was no other evidence of the suspect’s guilt, 
beyond the DNA match, then it is not necessarily likely that he, rather 
someone else with the matching profile, was the source of the bloodstain.57  
Indeed, if the suspect has a solid alibi, it might be far more likely that the 
bloodstain came from someone else, notwithstanding the DNA match.  On 
the other hand, if the suspect already appeared likely, based on other 
evidence, to be the source of the bloodstain, then finding he also shares the 
one-in-a-million DNA profile with the bloodstain might well support a 
conclusion that he is likely to be the source of the stain.  My point is that the 
source probability cannot be inferred from the DNA evidence alone; it also 
depends on how strongly other evidence points toward or away from the 
suspect. 
The same problem arises when forensic examiners attempt to infer 
source probabilities from any type of forensic evidence.  This is an inherent 
problem of source probabilities.  Even if the examiner does not realize it, a 
statement that a suspect is “highly likely” to be the source of a bloodstain, 
for example, necessarily rests, in part, on an implicit assessment or 
assumption about the prior odds that the suspect is the source.  Making those 
assessments or assumptions takes forensic scientists beyond their scientific 
expertise in ways that arguably usurp the role of legal fact-finders.  Experts 
are rarely in a good position to evaluate the prior odds that the items they are 
comparing have a common source, and arguably have no business doing so.  
Consequently, many commentators have suggested that forensic experts 
 
Consequently, examiners must necessarily consider or make assumptions about matters 
beyond forensic science in order to reach source conclusions.  See, I.W. Evett, Toward a 
Uniform Framework For Reporting Opinions in Forensic Science Casework, 38 SCI. & JUST. 
198 (1998); Buckleton, supra note 6; Morrison, supra note 6; ROBERTON, VIGNAUX & 
BERGER, supra note 5; Thompson (2012), supra note 22.   
 57  There might be little or no evidence of a suspect’s guilt other than a DNA match in a 
case in which the suspect is identified through a “cold-hit” in a search of a large database. 
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avoid presenting source probabilities.58  As Professor Redmayne 
explained: . . . the expert should not testify in terms such as . . . : the blood 
probably came from the defendant”, because one can only reach conclusions 
of this sort by making assumptions about the strength of other evidence 
against the defendant.59 
Forensic scientists who report in this manner arguably have a special 
obligation to explain in their reports and testimony that their conclusions are 
not based solely on a comparison of the items in question but also rest partly 
on their assumptions about the strength of other evidence: “Unless the 
receiver of the opinion understands the prior, non-scientific information that 
influenced the scientist, there can be no assessment of the reliability and 
fairness of the opinion.”60 
2. Identifications Without Uniqueness 
The same problem sometimes arises when forensic scientists claim to 
have “identified” or “individualized” the source of an item.  In recent years, 
forensic scientists in pattern matching disciplines have begun to 
acknowledge that they do not have a scientific basis for determining whether 
the features of a particular item (e.g., a latent print) are unique in the entire 
world.  For example, some latent print examiners no longer claim to be able 
to associate a particular latent print to a single finger to the exclusion of all 
other fingers in the world.  They nevertheless claim to know (or be able to 
determine) whether the features of a latent print are rare enough that they are 
unlikely to be duplicated among the smaller group of individuals who are 
possible sources of a particular latent print.  They reason that the possible 
sources of a latent print at a typical crime scene is likely to be limited to 
people with access to the scene, and this group (which is sometimes called 
“the relevant population”) may be much, much smaller than the entire human 
population.  Consequently, to identify the suspect as the source of the latent 
print in question, they do not need to know whether the features shared by 
the latent print and his print are unique in the entire world; they just need to 
know that those shared features are sufficiently rare that it is unlikely another 
member of the relevant population will have those same features.  Thus it is 
possible to have identification without uniqueness.61 
 
 
 58  Evett, supra note 56; Buckleton, supra note 6; Morrison, supra note 6; ROBERTON, 
VIGNAUX & BERGER, supra note 5; Thompson (2012), supra note 22.   
 59  MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 46 (2001).   
 60  Jackson, supra note 6, at 426.   
 61  Another way to explain this approach is to say the examiner’s assessment of the 
“uniqueness” of the observed features is made with respect to a limited, localized sub-
population, rather than for the entire population of such items.   
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While the logic of this approach seems sound, it clearly requires the 
examiner to consider matters beyond the characteristics of the items being 
compared.  The examiner must determine that the suspect is a member of the 
relevant population—e.g., a possible source of the latent print, which 
presumably entails either an evaluation of, or assumptions about, the strength 
of any alibi the suspect might advance.  It also requires the examiner to know 
enough about the case to judge the size of the relevant population—i.e., how 
many people other than the suspect might have been the source of the item 
in question.  That, in turn, requires the examiner to consider, or make 
assumptions about, a number of matters that are likely to be contested if the 
case is tried.  So, like examiners who present source probabilities, examiners 
who make identifications in this manner must make assumptions about the 
strength of other evidence against the suspect. 
As with source probabilities, examiners who “identify” the source of 
items in this manner arguably incur a special obligation to disclose their 
underlying assumptions.  Suppose, for example, that an examiner 
“identified” an individual as the source of a particular item based, in part, on 
the assumption that the suspect was one of a small number of people who 
could have been the source.  Without knowing that the examiner’s 
conclusion depended on this assumption, recipients of this information have 
no way to assess whether the conclusion is reasonable and fair.62  Even if the 
assumption is disclosed, it might be difficult for recipients to judge the 
probative value of this evidence, particularly if they had reason to question 
or disagree with the examiner’s assumption.63 
IV. EVALUATING LAY REACTIONS TO FORENSIC EVIDENCE 
Having discussed various ways source conclusions might be presented 
in reports and testimony, I will now turn to the question of how the 
presentation format affects lay people’s perceptions of this evidence.  This 
requires discussion of a growing body of research on lay reactions to forensic 
science evidence.64 
 
 62  See Jackson, supra note 6, at 426.   
 63  To avoid “double-counting” of evidence, a fact-finder would need to assess the 
“incremental probative value” of the expert’s conclusion, which is the value added by the 
examiner’s opinion beyond the value provided by other evidence in the case that the fact-
finder has already considered.  See Thompson, 2016, supra note 53, for explanation of this 
point. 
 64  For recent reviews of this literature, see Graham Jackson, David H. Kaye, Cedric 
Neumann, Anjali Ranadive & Valerie F. Reyna, Communicating the Results of Forensic 
Science Examinations: Final Technical Report for NIST Award 70NANB12H014 (Penn State 
Law Research Paper No. 22-2015, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abst
ract_id=2690899; Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, Communicating Opinion 
Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact,  59 HASTINGS L.J. 
1159 (2008).  For reviews of earlier studies, see D.H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, Can Jurors 
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The most common method for studying lay reactions is a trial 
simulation study in which participants are asked to evaluate hypothetical 
criminal cases while the researchers experimentally vary the nature of the 
evidence. Studies relevant to forensic evidence have experimentally varied 
whether the evidence against the defendant includes (or does not include) 
testimony of a forensic examiner; these studies have also varied the type and 
strength of the forensic science evidence and the presentation format.65  The 
studies differ in how elaborately they present the hypothetical case, ranging 
from simple written summaries of evidence to elaborate simulations of trial 
testimony. Participants in these studies also vary, ranging from 
undergraduates, to participants in online research panels, to people recruited 
from jury pools. 
A. Lay Perceptions of the Relative Strength of Various Reporting 
Statements 
Studies that have tested the effects of presentation format on people’s 
reactions to forensic science evidence have often found that the format 
makes a difference.  Presentations that should logically be given the same 
weight are sometimes treated differently.  For example, Thompson and 
Schumann66 found that participants in a trial simulation study gave more 
weight to statements about conditional probability (e.g., “a two percent 
chance the defendant’s hair would be indistinguishable . . . if he were 
innocent”) than statements that focused on the percentage and number (“2% 
of people would be indistinguishable; that would be 20,000 in a city of 1 
million”).  Goodman67 and Lindsey et al.68 found that people gave more 
weight to RMPs when stated as percentages (e.g., 1/10th of 1%) than 
frequencies (1 in 1000). 
 Koehler and his colleagues have also shown that minor (and logically 
irrelevant) variations in the way statistics are presented in connection with a 
forensic match can have striking effects on the weight people give the 
 
Understand Probabilistic Evidence?, 154 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC. 75 (1991); William C. 
Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 9 (1989).   
 65  Some of the studies employ between-subject designs in which different versions of the 
case are presented to different groups of participants.  Some of the studies employ within-
subject designs in which participants evaluate the case before and after receiving forensic 
evidence.   
 66  William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence 
in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy, 11 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987).   
 67  Jane Goodman, Jurors’ Comprehension and Assessment of Probabilistic Evidence, 16 
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 361 (1992).   
 68  Samuel Lindsey, Ralph Hertwig & Gerd Gigerenzer, Communicating Statistical DNA 
Evidence, 43 JURIMETRICS 147 (2003).   
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evidence.  For example, participants in a trial simulation study gave much 
more weight to a DNA match when the random match probability was 
expressed as a percentage using language that focuses on the suspect (“the 
probability the suspect would match the blood drops if he is not their source 
is 0.1%”) than when it was expressed as a frequency within a broader 
reference group (“One in 1000 people in Houston would also match the 
blood drops”).69  This effect probably arises from people’s tendency to 
evaluate the strength of a forensic match according to the ease with which 
they can imagine that other people, besides the suspect, might match.  
According to “exemplar cueing theory,” formats that draw attention to the 
number of people who could match in a large population make it easier to 
imagine false matches occurring, which reduces the impact of the forensic 
evidence.70 
Several studies have compared perceptions of LRs with perceptions of 
comparable match frequencies (or RMPs), although the results have been 
mixed.  Koehler found that jury-eligible students judging a DNA case gave 
more weight to LRs (100 times more likely) than comparable match 
frequencies (1 person out of every 100).71  Nance and Morris conducted two 
important studies with members of a jury pool.72  In both studies they found 
that participants gave significantly more weight to LRs than RMPs, but only 
when the LRs were accompanied by a chart explaining how to update a prior 
probability in light of a LR.  Without the chart, the weight given LRs and 
RMPs did not significantly differ.  Thompson & Newman73 found that 
participants recruited from an online labor pool did not differ in the weight 
they gave LRs and RMPs when evaluating DNA evidence; but found 
participants gave more weight to RMPs than LRs when evaluating shoe print 
evidence. 
With some colleagues at the University of California, Irvine I have 
recently been studying lay perceptions of the relative strength of various 
conclusions that a forensic scientist might present about whether two items 
(fingerprints; biological samples) have a common source.74  We adopted a 
 
 69 Jonathan J. Koehler, When Are People Persuaded by DNA Match Statistics?, 25 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 493 (2001).   
 70  Jonathan J. Koehler & Laura Maachi, Thinking About Low Probability Events: An 
Exemplar-Cuing Theory, 15 PSYCH. SCI. 540 (2004).   
 71  Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA Evidence: 
Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 859 (1996).   
 72  Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats 
for Trace Evidence With a Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability, 42 
JURIMETRICS J. 403 (2002); Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA 
Evidence: An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a 
Relatively Small Random Match Probability, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 395 (2005).   
 73  Supra note 26.   
 74  The materials reported here are drawn from a working paper: William C. Thompson,, 
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method known as paired comparison that was originally used in the field of 
psychometrics to study perceptions of the strength of physical stimuli (e.g., 
the brightness of a light, the intensity of a sound).75  In a series of studies, we 
presented statements to participants76 in pairs and asked participants to judge 
which statement indicated the evidence was stronger for proving the items 
have a common source.  For example, in one study participants were asked 
to evaluate the relative strength of two statements about the result of a 
fingerprint comparison: (1) the examiner’s claim to have “identified” the 
prints as coming from the same finger, or (2) the examiner’s claim that “the 
likelihood of observing this amount of corresponding ridge detail when two 
fingerprints are made by different people is less than 1 in 100,000.” Various 
statements were paired randomly and each participant was asked to evaluate 
the relative strength of about sixteen random pairs.  By combining data 
across participants, we were able to generate rankings of the perceived 
strength of the statements, relative to one another.  By fitting the data to 
statistical models we were able to assess the statistical significance of 
differences in rankings.77 
Our results suggest that statements involving large numbers—either 
RMPs and LRs—are perceived as very powerful.  For a fingerprint 
comparison, a RMP of 1 in 100,000 was as strong as the categorical 
statement that the examiner had “identified” or “individualized” the print; 
the RMP of 1 in 10 million was even stronger.  For DNA evidence, a LR of 
100,000 was as strong as the categorical statement that the evidence proved 
the suspect “was the source;” and a LR of 10 million was stronger still. 
 
 
Rebecca Grady, Eric Lai & Hal S. Stern, Perceived Strength of Forensic Scientists’ Reporting 
Statements About Source Conclusions (Dec. 10, 2017) (unpublished draft) (on file with 
authors).  A version of this paper has been accepted for publication in the journal Law, 
Probability and Risk.   
 75  People have difficulty providing meaningful evaluations of the strength of such stimuli 
on rating scales (e.g., “How loud is this sound on a scale of 1-10?”).  Responses tend to be 
unreliable, poorly calibrated, and affected by contextual factors, such as the volume of 
previously heard sounds, and by the nature of the rating scale.  People do better, however, 
when reporting which of two sounds is louder than when rating the loudness of various sounds 
on a scale.  In 1927, L.L. Thurstone demonstrated that pair-wise comparison can be used to 
order multiple items in a scale of strength or magnitude.  L.L. Thurstone, A Law of 
Comparative Judgment, 34 PSYCHOL. REV. 273 (1927).  We used this method to estimate the 
perceived strength of forensic science reporting statements.   
 76  Participants were jury-eligible U.S. adults from mTurk, an online labor pool.   
 77  The data were fitted to Thurstone-Mosteller paired comparison models to obtain rank-
ordered lists of the various statements and an indication of the perceived differences among 
them.  See, Thurstone, supra note 75; Fredrick Mosteller, Remarks on the Method of Paired 
Comparisons: I. The Least Squares Solution Assuming Equal Standard Deviations and Equal 
Correlations, 16 PSYCHOMETRIKA 3 (1951); Hal Stern, A Continuum of Paired Comparisons 
Models, 77 BIOMETRIKA 265 (1990).   
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Some non-numerical statements about strength of support were also 
perceived to be powerful.  Saying that a fingerprint comparison provides 
“extremely strong support” for the theory that the suspect made the print was 
seen as roughly equivalent to saying that it was “a practical certainty that the 
suspect was the source;” saying the comparison provides “extremely strong 
support” for the theory that the suspect made the print was perceived to be 
stronger than saying that it is “highly probable” the suspect made the print. 
Saying a DNA match provides “extremely strong support” for the theory of 
a common source was seen as roughly equivalent to saying that the RMP is 
1 in 100,000 or the LR is 100,000.  So our results suggest that it is possible 
to make a strong statement about the probative value of a forensic 
comparison by talking about strength of support rather than relying on the 
traditional claim of identification/individualization. 
Interestingly, simply saying that the ridge patterns of two fingerprints 
“match” was also perceived to be an extremely strong statement about the 
probative value of a fingerprint comparison.78  This finding raises concerns 
because, as noted earlier, forensic examiners use the term “match” merely to 
convey that the items share the same attributes, which does not necessarily 
imply that the forensic comparison is highly probative.79  It is not clear 
whether the term “match” will be equally powerful with other forms of 
forensic evidence, but our findings suggest that forensic scientists should use 
this term cautiously, if at all, when reporting their conclusions, particularly 
when there is uncertainty about the probative value of the matching features 
for proving the items have a common source. 
The statement on likelihood of correspondence proposed by the 
Defense Forensic Science Center of the United States Army was perceived 
to be significantly weaker, when used to characterize a fingerprint 
comparison, than reporting “identification” or “individualization.”  It was 
also weaker than saying the results provide “extremely strong support” for 
the theory of a common source  Relative to the RMP statements, the army 
statement fell between “1 in 100,000” and “1 in 1000,” differing significantly 
from both. 
With regard to the verbal expressions recommended by the Association 
of Forensic Science Providers (see Table 1), our findings suggest that two of 
these expressions—”weak support” and “moderate support” are indeed 
perceived in the manner intended.  In other words, participants perceived the 
verbal expression as being roughly equal in strength to the corresponding 
 
 78 People also give a great deal of weight to testimony that two hairs “match.” See Dawn 
McQuiston_Surrett & Michael J. Saks, The Testimony of Forensic Identification Science: 
What Experts Say and What Factfinders Hear, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 436 (2009); 
McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 64.   
 79  See supra note 46 and accompanying text.   
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LR.  On the other hand, our participants thought the expression “extremely 
strong support” was weaker than the corresponding LR.  AFSP 
recommended using the term “extremely strong support” when the LR 
exceeds 1 million, but our participants found “extremely strong support” to 
be equivalent or weaker than a RMP of 1 in 100,000.  Our findings suggest 
that forensic scientists who are seeking a verbal statement comparable in 
strength to a RMP of 1 in 1 million, or a LR of 1 million, more may need to 
find something stronger than “extremely strong support.” 
Of course, it is important to consider whether such strong statements 
are warranted when describing the strength of forensic source comparisons 
in disciplines other than DNA analysis.  If it would be an exaggeration to 
report a LR of 100,000 or higher when explaining the strength of a latent 
print, tool mark, or footwear comparison, then arguably it is also an 
exaggeration to say that the comparison provides “extremely strong support” 
for the theory of a common source (given that “extremely strong support” is 
viewed as equivalent in strength to the LR of 100,000).  In this regard it is 
noteworthy that the false identification rate of latent print examiners in the 
largest black-box study of examiner accuracy80 was approximately 0.17%, 
or one false identification for every 588 comparisons of prints from different 
people for which examiners were able to reach a source conclusion.81  Even 
higher error rates have been observed in some studies.82  The error rates 
observed in these studies suggest that the LR describing the strength of a 
latent print identification may well be closer to 1000 than to 100,000.  Hence, 
reporting that a latent print comparison provides “extremely strong” support 
for a common source may be more than adequate to convey an accurate 
impression of the strength of this evidence.  In fact, if one were seeking a 
verbal expression that is equivalent to reporting a LR of 1000, then the 
statement proposed by the United States Army’s Defense Forensic Science 
 
 80  Bradford T. Ulery, R. Austin Hicklin, Joann Buscaglia & Maria Antonia Roberts, 
Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. 
SCI. 7733 (2011).   
 81  For an analysis of the error rates in this study, see AAAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 55 
(“A total of 4083 different-source pairs were deemed of value for identification, and 
examiners were able to make conclusive calls on 3638 of those pairs.  Six of those calls were 
erroneous identifications (0.17%)”).  The PCAST report, supra note 15, also analyzed this 
study and reported that the upper 95% confidence bound of the false identification rate was 
0.33%, which corresponds to 1false identification for every 306 different-source comparisons 
that led to a source determination. 
 82  See, e.g., Igor Pacheco, Brian Cerchiai & Stephanie Stoiloff, Miami-Dade Research 
Study for the Reliability of the ACE-V Process: Accuracy & Precision in Latent Fingerprint 
Examinations, MIAMI DADE POLICE DEP’T FORENSIC SERVS. BUREAU (Dec. 2014), https://ww
w.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248534.pdf.  For detailed discussion of error rates in latent 
print examinations, see AAAS REPORT, supra note 4; Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: 
Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 985 
(2005).   
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Center83 would be a more reasonable choice. 
One must be cautious about arguments of this kind, however, because 
they rely on research that compares the perceived strength of various 
possible reporting statements relative to one another.  It seems reasonable to 
infer that people will give roughly equal weight to a latent print comparison 
when the examiner reports a LR of 100,000 as when the examiner reports 
that the comparison provides “extremely strong support” for a common 
source.  But the research discussed thus far does not tell us whether the 
weight given to the evidence when presented in either manner will be 
appropriate.  People may see the statements as roughly equivalent in strength 
but may give both statements more weight or less weight than they deserve. 
Readers should also bear in mind that participants in these studies were 
responding to short written summaries of the examiners’ conclusions about 
fingerprint and DNA comparisons, similar to what might be found in a 
written report.  The same statements may well be viewed differently when 
presented in connection with other types of forensic evidence.  It is also 
possible that people will respond differently to such conclusions when 
examiners have the opportunity to explain and elaborate upon them during 
testimony. In order to resolve these questions, additional research is needed 
on how widely these finding generalize across evidence types and 
presentation modalities. 
B. Assessing the Appropriateness of Lay Responses to Forensic 
Science Evidence 
What is an “appropriate” response to a forensic scientist’s testimony?  
How do we determine whether a particular juror’s conclusions are based on 
clear-eyed understanding of the expert’s testimony, rather than a biased or 
incorrect distortion thereof?  Suppose, for example, that a shift in reporting 
format—from “individualization” to LRs, for example—produces a change 
in lay reactions to forensic science evidence.  How do we judge whether that 
change is harmful or beneficial?  In the sections that follow, I will propose 
two criteria for assessing appropriateness: whether people’s responses are 
sensitive to the strength of the forensic evidence, and whether people’s 
responses are logically consistent with the forensic evidence.84 
 
 
 83  See supra note 42, and accompanying text. 
 84  Thompson & Newman, supra note 26, proposed three criteria for evaluating the 
appropriateness of reactions to forensic science evidence, which they called sensitivity, 
logical coherence, and susceptibility to fallacy.  In the analysis presented here, I combine the 
second and third of these categories.   
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1. Sensitivity to the Strength of Evidence 
If people are responding to forensic evidence appropriately, their 
judgments should be sensitive to the strength of the forensic evidence.  They 
should give more weight to forensic evidence when it is strong and therefore 
deserves more weight; they should give less weight to forensic evidence 
when it is weak and therefore deserves less weight.  Consequently, we should 
prefer presentation formats that promote sensitivity to the strength of 
evidence, and avoid presentation formats that render people insensitive to 
the strength of evidence. 
Several studies have examined lay people’s sensitivity to variations in 
RMPs when evaluating forensic science evidence in hypothetical criminal 
cases.  The majority of these studies found that people give more weight to 
the forensic evidence when the RMP is low than when it is higher, as they 
should.85  There were two exceptions in which variations in RMP did have a 
statistically significant effect on the weight given to forensic evidence,86 but 
the literature as a whole suggests that people understand and respond 
appropriately to this variable.  This conclusion is bolstered by the recent 
research my colleagues and I conducted on perceptions of the relative 
strength of reporting statements.  When we asked people to compare two 
statements about RMPs for DNA or fingerprint evidence, most people 
correctly perceived the statement with the lower RMP to be stronger.87 
Whether people are also sensitive to variations in LRs and Strength of 
Support Statements is less clear. Martire and her colleagues have reported 
that people “were only weakly sensitive to large differences” in LRs and 
Strength-of-Support statements when evaluating shoeprint evidence.88  
Thompson and Newman89 also found that people were insensitive to LRs and 
Strength-of-Support statements when evaluating shoeprint evidence, but 
found that people were sensitive to these variables when evaluating DNA 
 
 85  David L. Faigman & A.J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes’ Theorem in the Trial Process: 
Instructing Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1988); 
Goodman, supra note 67 (Study 2); Brian C. Smith, Steven D. Penrod, Amy L. Otto & Roger 
C. Park, Jurors’ Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 49 (1996); 
Thompson & Newman, supra note 26.   
 86  Goodman, supra note 67 (Study 1) (reporting that varying match frequencies of 10%, 
5%, 1% and 0.1% produced only slight changes in participants’ reactions to blood group 
evidence); Koehler, supra note 71 (finding no significant differences in reactions to a match 
frequency of 1 in 100 versus 1 in 1000 in a DNA case).   
 87  Thompson, Grady, Lai & Stern, supra note 74.  A minority of participants in these 
studies initially said the statement with the higher RMP was stronger, but most of them 
realized their error when given additional explanation.  
 88  Martire et al., 2013, supra note 26; see also Kristy A. Martire et al., On the 
Interpretation of Likelihood Ratios in Forensic Science Evidence: Presentation Formats and 
the Weak Evidence Effect, 240 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 61 (2014).   
 89  Supra note 26.   
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evidence.  Thompson and Newman speculated that people’s preconceptions 
about forensic evidence may have made them skeptical when experts 
presented large LRs and strong Strength-of-Support statements in 
connection with shoeprint evidence, but more accepting of such statements 
when offered in connection with DNA evidence.90  Additional research to 
follow up on these findings is clearly warranted. 
The studies by Martire et al. and by Thompson and Newman required 
participants to evaluate written summaries of evidence.  In a more recent set 
of studies, my colleagues and I have asked participants to view videos of 
simulated testimony by a forensic voice comparison expert who used 
likelihood ratios to describe the strength of his findings, and offered a clear 
explanation of what a LR is.  These studies found that participants’ 
judgments were sensitive to the strength of the reported LR—they gave 
significantly more weight to the voice print evidence when the reported LR 
was 3000 than when it was thirty.91  While these findings are reassuring with 
respect to LRs, much more research is needed to test people’s understanding 
of LRs and Strength of Support statements. 
There is has been relative little research on lay reactions to the kind of 
error rate data recommended by PCAST, although the reported studies 
indicate people can be sensitive to error rate data.  Thompson, Kaasa & 
Peterson92 found that undergraduates were sensitive to the probability of a 
false match when evaluating the strength of DNA evidence.  In a second 
study they found that members of a jury pool did not necessarily accept an 
expert’s estimate of the probability of a false DNA match due to laboratory 
error, although their assessments of the strength of the DNA evidence varied 
appropriately in accordance with their own estimates of the probability of a 
false match. 
In an earlier study, Kaasa et al. found that undergraduate participants in 
a jury simulation study gave more weight to bullet lead evidence when they 
were provided with statistical data suggesting it had strong “diagnostic 
value” than when the data suggested the evidence was worthless (non-
diagnostic), or when no data were presented.93  Interestingly, the study found 
 
 90  Interestingly, Thompson and Newman also found that judgments about shoeprint 
evidence were sensitive to variations in RMPs.  People tended to give more weight to 
shoeprint evidence when the RMP was low (1 in 1 million) than when it was more moderate 
(1 in 1000), but a similar variation in LRs produced no effect. 
 91  William C. Thompson, Rebecca Grady & Eryn J. Newman, Lay Understanding of 
Likelihood Ratios Presented by a Forensic Voice Comparison Expert (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).   
 92  Supra note 27.   
 93  Suzanne O. Kaasa, Tiamovo Peterson, Erin K. Morris & William C. Thompson, 
Statistical Inference and Forensic Evidence: Evaluating a Bullet Lead Match, 31 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2007).  Participants were asked to judge the value of bullet lead evidence 
for proving a bullet found at a crime scene came from a stock of bullets owned by a defendant.  
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that group deliberation improved participants’ ability to draw conclusions 
from the statistical data.  It was only after group deliberation that participants 
appreciated that the bullet lead evidence deserved no weight in the condition 
where statistical data indicated the evidence was non-diagnostic and was 
therefore worthless.  The study also found variation across participants in 
their sensitivity to variations in the statistical data.  Participants who 
expressed more confidence in their ability to understand and use numerical 
data were more likely to respond to the statistical data in the appropriate 
manner (by giving weight to the evidence only when the data indicated it had 
diagnostic value), while those who expressed less confidence were 
insensitive to the variation in statistical data. 
A recent study on people’s reaction to negative evidence—the failure 
to detect gunshot residue on an individual suspected of firing a gun—found 
that participants recruited from an online database were sensitive to 
statistical data about the probability of detection, although the authors note 
that “jurors may evaluate negative evidence according to a fairly crude 
metric—-giving it no weight if the probability of detection is zero, a great 
deal of weight if the probability of detection is 100%, and moderate weight 
if the probability of detection is somewhere in between.” 94 
2. Logical Coherence 
A second criterion for evaluating whether people are responding to 
forensic science evidence appropriately is whether their responses follow 
logically from the evidence.  If a particular presentation format causes people 
to respond to the evidence in a manner that is illogical, or logically 
incoherent,95 that is cause for concern.  Researchers have often used Bayes’ 
rule as a normative standard for determining whether people’s responses to 
forensic evidence are logical.96 
 
Statistics were provided on the probability of finding bullets matching the chemical profile of 
a crime scene bullet among the defendant’s stock of bullets and the probability of finding such 
bullets among a sample of bullets found in the broader community were the crime occurred.  
When the former probability greatly exceeded the latter, the evidence was deemed diagnostic 
(meaning it has strong probative value); when the two probabilities were equal, the evidence 
was non-diagnostic, meaning it had no probative value for determining whether the crime 
scene bullet came from the defendant or someone else.   
 94  William C. Thompson, Nicholas Scurich, Rachel Dioso-Villa & Brenda Velazquez, 
Evaluating Negative Forensic Evidence: When Do Jurors Treat Absence of Evidence as 
Evidence of Absence?, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 569, 569 (2017).   
 95 Logical incoherence consists of holding beliefs that are logically inconsistent with one 
another.  See Thompson & Newman, supra note 26.  An example of incoherence would be a 
person who believes that the chances of a false DNA match are extraordinarily low (which 
implies that the DNA evidence deserves a lot of weight), but who updates his beliefs about 
the source of an item relatively little after receiving the DNA evidence (which implies that 
the DNA evidence deserves little weight). 
 96  See infra note 97.  Bayes’ rule is a formal description of how a rational actor should 
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i. Underutilization of Forensic Evidence 
A number of researchers have concluded that people “underutilize” 
forensic science, which means that they give less weight to the evidence than 
would be logical, given their beliefs about it.97  Based on this conclusion, 
some scholars have argued that we need not fear that forensic science 
evidence will be overvalued and prejudicial, and that forensic scientists 
should favor presentation formats that maximize the impact of forensic 
science evidence in order to combat the tendency toward underutilization.  
Several commentators have suggested, for example, that jurors be instructed 
on Bayesian updating in order to help them appreciate the strength of 
forensic evidence and overcome their tendency to give it too little weight.98 
I am skeptical of this conclusion.  While the research shows patterns of 
judgment that deviate from Bayesian norms, “underutilization” of forensic 
evidence is not the only possible explanation.  Many of the studies in this 
literature have methodological limitations that may have created a false 
appearance of “underutilization.”  Some of the studies used incomplete 
Bayesian models that failed to account for all possible sources of uncertainty.  
Participants in these studies may have updated their beliefs less than the 
Bayesian model specified because they were legitimately skeptical about the 
evidence for reasons not taken into account by the Bayesian models, rather 
than because their judgments were illogical.99  A false appearance of 
 
update beliefs about a particular hypothesis (or about a pair of alternative hypotheses) in light 
of new evidence.  ROBERTSON, VIGNAUX & BERGER, supra note 5.  Researchers can use 
Bayesian analysis to assess whether forensic science evidence causes people to change their 
beliefs about the source of an item in a manner that is logically consistent with their beliefs 
about the forensic evidence.  For example, several researchers have used Bayesian models to 
determine how DNA evidence should affect a rational actor’s belief about the probability that 
a defendant was the source of a biological sample, given the actor’s beliefs about the 
probability that the DNA evidence could falsely implicate the defendant through such 
mechanisms as a coincidental match, examiner error, or a frame up.  The models are, in effect, 
statements about the logical consistency of various beliefs a person might hold.   
 97  Thompson & Schumann, supra note 66; Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 86; 
Goodman, supra note 67; Brian C. Smith, Steven D. Penrod, Amy L. Otto & Roger C. Park, 
Jurors’ Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 49 (1996); Jason Schklar & 
Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectancies, 23 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (1999); Nance & Morris (2002), supra note 72; Nance & Morris 
(2005), supra note 72; Martire et al. supra note 26, but see Thompson, Kaasa & Peterson, 
supra note 27 (finding both underutilization and overutilization of forensic DNA evidence).   
 98  This suggestion was first put forth in 1970.  See Michael O. Finkelstein and William 
B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970).  It 
drew a famous response from Laurence Tribe, who objected to what he regarded as an 
unwarranted intrusion of mathematics into the trial process. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by 
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).  But 
suggestion that jurors be instructed on Bayesian updating, as a means of mitigating 
“underutilization,” have continued.  See, e.g., Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 85; Nance & 
Morris (2005), supra note 72.   
 99  For details on this issue, see Thompson, Kaasa & Peterson, supra note 27, at 361; 
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underutilization might also have arisen from the use of probability elicitation 
methods that artificially restricted the range of possible responses, and hence 
the degree to which people could express changes in their beliefs after 
receiving forensic evidence.  Ceiling effects—the well known tendency of 
people to avoid using the extreme ends of a response scale—may have 
created a false appearance of “underutilization” in some studies by making 
it difficult for some participants to indicate how much their beliefs had 
changed.100 
Beyond the methodological issues, there are theoretical reasons to 
question the conclusion that people underutilize forensic evidence.  
Psychologists have long recognized that ordinary people do not think like 
Bayesians.101  According to contemporary psychological theory, people 
employ a variety of heuristic strategies for evaluating evidence and updating 
beliefs—strategies that generally work well but can produce counter-
normative judgments in specific situations.102  Jonathan Koehler has 
extended these theories to encompass forensic evidence, showing how 
variations in reporting format can produce predictable variation in peoples’ 
evaluations of the strength of forensic comparisons.103  While these theories 
predict that people’s judgments will sometimes deviate from Bayesian 
norms, it is difficult to see why the underlying cognitive processes posited 
by the theories would cause a systematic tendency to underutilize forensic 
evidence, rather than errors that could lead either to underutilization or 
overutilization depending on the specific circumstances. 
My colleagues and I have recently re-visited the question of people’s 
consistency with Bayesian norms using more complete Bayesian models and 
improved probability elicitation methods designed to avoid ceiling effects.  
Our studies present a somewhat different picture than previous studies, at 
least for DNA evidence.  Thompson, Kaasa and Peterson found that people 
evaluating DNA evidence (participants included actual jurors) generally 
responded to it in a manner consistent with Bayesian norms; under some 
circumstances DNA evidence caused people’s judgments to shift more than 
Bayesian norms would dictate—suggesting that they may have given too 
 
Thompson & Newman, supra note 26, at 334.   
 100  The potential for ceiling effects in this research is discussed in Smith et al., supra note 
97; Thompson, Kaasa & Peterson, supra note 27; Thompson & Newman, supra note 26.   
 101  See Spellman, supra note 26; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective 
Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 450 (1972) (“. . . 
man is apparently not a conservative Bayesian: he is not Bayesian at all”).   
 102  See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974), http://psiexp.ss.uci.edu/research/teaching/Tver
sky_Kahneman_1974.pdf; JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTIES: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).   
 103  See Koehler (2001), supra note 69; Koehler & Maachi, supra note 70.   
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much weight to the DNA evidence.104 
Thompson and Newman also found that people’s responses to DNA 
evidence were consistent with Bayesian norms, but found people violated 
Bayesian norms when they evaluated shoeprint evidence.105  People gave less 
weight to shoeprint evidence than the Bayesian model said they should even 
after taking into account their beliefs about the probability of a coincidental 
match, lab error and frame-up.  People apparently perceived shoeprint 
evidence to be weak (relative to DNA evidence) in ways that were not 
captured by the Bayesian model.  Thompson and Newman suggest that 
people’s reactions to forensic evidence are complex and are influenced by a 
number of variables.  Impressions about the value of evidence and the 
credibility of experts that have been shaped by popular culture may be as 
important as the words experts speak in determining the weight people give 
to forensic evidence. 
While there are reasons to be skeptical of claims that people inevitably, 
or systematically, underutilize forensic science evidence, there clearly is 
much we do not know about factors affecting the weight people give this 
evidence.  Additional research is needed on how people weigh various 
factors that affect the probative value of forensic evidence, such as the 
probability of a coincidental match, a false incrimination due to laboratory 
error, or a frame up.  It would also be useful to explore whether people’s 
beliefs about error rates, match probabilities, and related matters are 
reasonable (i.e., consistent with the best evidence), and how those beliefs are 
affected by the way forensic examiners present their conclusions.  If 
misconceptions are distorting their views of the value of forensic evidence, 
that issue will need to be addressed as well. 
ii. Fallacious Reasoning 
Another kind of logical incoherence can be caused by people’s 
tendency to evaluate forensic science using illogical strategies that arise from 
a fundamental misunderstanding of probabilistic evidence.  One error, often 
called the prosecutor’s fallacy, arises from mistakenly assuming that a 
random match probability equates to the probability the defendant is 
innocent.106  As Thompson and Newman have explained: 
 
 104  Thompson, Kaasa & Peterson, supra note 27.  The evidence for “overutilization” of 
DNA evidence occurred when random match probability was extremely low (1 in 1 trillion) 
but the probability of a false match due to cross-contamination in the laboratory was much 
higher (1 in 100).  Participants may have had difficulty aggregating data on the probability of 
a coincidental match with data on the probability of a false match due to lab error, causing 
them to discount insufficiently for the latter source of error.   
 105  Thompson & Newman, supra note 26.   
 106  See Thompson & Schumann, supra note 66; Nance and Morris (2002), supra note 72; 
Nance and Morris (2005) supra note 72; David H. Kaye, Valerie P. Hans, B. Michael Dann, 
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. . . people sometimes mistakenly assume that they can infer the 
probability that matching items have (or do not have) a common 
source from the random match probability (RMP).  If an expert 
reports that a defendant matches a DNA sample and that the 
probability a random person would match is 1 in 1 million, for 
example, people sometimes assume that this necessarily means 
there is one chance in a million that the DNA sample came from 
someone other than the defendant—a mistake of logic that has 
been called the “source probability error” and the “fallacy of the 
transposed conditional.”  . . .  In cases where the defendant’s 
identity as the perpetrator is the sole issue . . . people sometimes 
mistakenly equate the RMP with the probability the defendant is 
innocent—an error known as “the prosecutor’s fallacy” . . . .107 
 
Thompson and Newman found that people are susceptible to the same 
error when evaluating LRs: 
 
The same erroneous logic (arising from transposition of 
conditional probabilities) might also lead to fallacious 
interpretation of likelihood ratios.  If an expert says the DNA 
evidence is one million times more likely if the defendant, rather 
than a random person, is the source of a sample, for example, then 
people might mistakenly assume that this means it is one million 
times more likely that the defendant, rather than a random person, 
is the source of the sample.108 
 
In either case, the fallacy may cause a serious misinterpretation of the 
evidence.  “. . . The danger of this fallacy is that it leads people to think they 
can determine the probability the defendant is (or is not) the source from the 
forensic evidence alone, without considering the other evidence.”109 
The key issues for researchers are how often people fall victim to 
fallacious reasoning, how much these logical errors influence their 
judgments, and whether people’s susceptibility to error is influenced by the 
presentation format used by the forensic scientist. 
Researchers have provided a wide range of estimates of how frequently 
people fall victim to the prosecutor’s fallacy.  Differences across studies are 
 
Erin Farley & Stephanie Albertson, Statistics in the Jury Box: How Jurors Respond to 
Mitochondrial DNA Match Probabilities, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 797 (2007); 
Thompson, Kaasa & Peterson, supra note 27.   
 107  See supra note 26 at 335.   
 108  Id.   
 109  Id.   
THOMPSON(DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2018  1:18 PM 
2018] SOURCE CONCLUSIONS 807 
due in part to ways in which researchers judged whether people were making 
fallacious judgments.  A common approach is to assume participants are 
committing the prosecutor’s fallacy when they judge the probability of the 
defendant’s guilt to be the exact complement of the random match 
probability.  Thompson and Schumann110 found that 13.2% of participants 
judged the probability of the defendant’s guilt to be exactly 98% (which was 
higher than Bayesian norms) in a case in which the defendant was linked to 
the crime by serological evidence and the random match probability was 2%.  
These participants defended their conclusion with fallacious arguments, 
suggesting, for example, that because there was only a 2% chance the 
defendant would have “matched” if he was innocent, the evidence of the 
match implies a 98% chance that he is guilty.  However, the percentage of 
participants who made judgments consistent with the prosecutor’s fallacy 
dropped to only 3% in a second study111 in which participants read lawyers’ 
arguments about the strength of the forensic evidence.  In subsequent studies, 
the percentage making judgments consistent with the prosecutor’s fallacy 
has varied but it was generally low.112  The frequency of judgments 
consistent with the prosecutor’s fallacy undoubtedly depends, in part, on 
how the random match probability is presented and explained to the jury and 
on how easy it is for participants to express such judgments.113 
The studies cited so far judged whether people committed the 
prosecutor’s fallacy by seeing whether their estimate of the probability of 
guilt was the exact complement of the random match probability.  This is a 
rather exacting requirement and may underestimate the number of people 
who are confused by fallacious reasoning.  Thompson and Newman114 took 
a different approach.  After participants had reviewed the trial evidence, they 
presented the participants with a series of statements regarding the 
implications of the forensic science evidence and asked participants which 
 
 110  Supra note 66 (Study 1). 
 111  Id. (Study 2).   
 112  2% in Goodman, supra note 67; 4% in Smith et al., supra note 97; 6% in Nance and 
Morris (2002), supra note 72; 0.3% in Nance & Morris (2005), supra note 72; but an estimated 
16% in Kaye et al., supra note 106.   
 113  One reason for the low percentage (0.3%) in Nance & Morris (2005), supra note 72, 
for example, may have been that the random match probability was 1 in 40,000 (or 0.000025), 
as a consequence of which the researchers coded participants’ judgments as consistent with 
the prosecutor’s fallacy only if they said the probability of guilt was exactly 0.999975 
(99.9975%).  As the researchers acknowledged, some participants who fell victim to 
fallacious reasoning may have been missed in this assessment because they miscalculated the 
percentage, or simply rounded to 99%.  In a case involving mtDNA evidence where the RMP 
was less than 1%, Kaye et al., supra note 106, found that 48% of mock jurors agreed with the 
proposition that “the mtDNA evidence in this case shows that there is about a 1% chance that 
someone else besides the defendant committed the crime.”  But the researchers argued that 
jurors could have arrived at this conclusion without committing the prosecutor’s fallacy.   
 114  Supra note 26.   
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statements were a correct interpretation of what the expert had said.  Some 
of the statements correctly indicated that the expert had testified about the 
probability of the observed results given the hypotheses.115  Other statements 
incorrectly transposed the conditional and indicated that the expert had 
testified about the probability that the same-source hypothesis is true given 
the observed results.  Nearly two-thirds of participants who heard testimony 
about RMPs or LRs thought the “correct interpretation” was a statement that 
transposed the conditional—suggesting a high level of misunderstanding.  
Furthermore, participants who chose the fallacious statement as a “correct 
interpretation” were more likely to have voted in favor of convicting the 
defendant—suggesting that misinterpretations of the expert’s statistical 
statements can have important consequences. 
In a subsequent study, Thompson, Grady and Newman116 asked 
participants to evaluate simulated testimony by a voice comparison expert, 
who presented and explained likelihood ratios.  About 80% of these 
participants thought the “correct interpretation” of the expert’s testimony 
was a statement that transposed the conditional probabilities.117  Those who 
agreed with the fallacious interpretation also gave more weight to the voice 
comparison evidence when assessing the defendant’s guilt. 
When evaluating forensic science evidence, people sometimes fall 
victim to another logical error called the “defense attorney’s fallacy.”118  
Victims of this fallacy mistakenly assume that a forensic match has little or 
no probative value for incriminating the defendant if someone other than the 
defendant could also have matched.  This error may cause people to 
underutilize forensic evidence, or ignore it entirely, when evaluating a 
case.119 
Finally, researchers regularly observe a third kind of logical error—
some people respond to forensic evidence by changing their beliefs in the 
wrong direction.  Generally this happens when people respond to forensic 
evidence that is reported to be weakly incriminating by revising downward 
their belief in the probability of the defendant’s guilt, hence it has been called 
 
 115  Experts who presented RMPs were testifying about the probability of the observed 
results given the hypothesis that the items being compared had a different source; experts who 
presented LRs were testifying about the relative probability of the observed results under the 
two alternative hypotheses—i.e., same-source or different-source.   
 116  Supra note 91.   
 117  The expert had testified that the evidence observed in the forensic comparison of 
voices was either 30 or 3000 times more likely if the defendant was the speaker on a contested 
recording than if the speaker was another individual from the relevant population.  The 
statement that 80% of participants viewed as the “correct interpretation” said the expert had 
testified that it was 30 or 3000 times more likely that the defendant was the speaker given the 
evidence observed in the forensic comparison of voices.   
 118  Thompson & Schumann, supra note 66; Thompson, Kaasa & Peterson, supra note 27.   
 119  Thompson & Newman, supra note 26.   
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a “weak evidence effect.”120  When Martire and her colleagues asked people 
to evaluate shoeprint evidence and fingerprint evidence that incriminated a 
defendant, they found that a majority of participants revised their belief in 
the defendant’s guilt downward when the expert explained the strength of 
the evidence by saying it provided “weak or limited support” for the 
hypothesis that the defendant was the source of an incriminating item at the 
crime scene.121  One possible explanation for this finding is that participants 
misunderstood the expert’s statement about the strength of the evidence for 
supporting the hypotheses as a statement about the probability that the 
hypothesis is true.  In other words, this phenomenon may be another 
manifestation of confusion over conditional probabilities. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
I began this Article by suggesting two criteria for determining the way 
forensic scientists should report source conclusions: (1) whether the reported 
conclusions can be justified logically and empirically; and (2) whether the 
reported conclusions will be understood and used appropriately.  In the 
discussion that followed, I suggested that some of the most commonly used 
forensic reporting formats fail (or might fail) the first criterion. 
There is legitimate skepticism in the broader scientific community 
about claims that examiners in pattern-matching disciplines can link an item 
to a single possible source by discerning that the item has unique features.  
Consequently, forensic examiners are on shaky ground when they claim to 
have “identified” or “individualized” the source of a trace or impression 
found at a crime scene.  Concern about this problem has prompted discussion 
among forensic scientists about the possibility of reporting source 
conclusions in different ways.  One of my goals in writing this Article is to 
provide a helpful perspective to forensic scientists regarding possible 
options. 
There is also reason to be skeptical about reporting source probabilities 
(e.g., claiming a “99% chance” or a “high probability” that items have a 
common source) because forensic examiners must consider or make 
assumptions about matters beyond their scientific expertise to draw 
conclusions about source probabilities.  Source probabilities are hybrid 
conclusions, based partly on the examiner’s analysis of the physical 
characteristics of the items being compared, and partly on the examiner’s 
assumptions or conclusions about the strength of other evidence that bears 
on whether the items have a common source.122  Whether hybrid conclusions 
 
 120  Martire et al. (2013), supra note 26; Martire et al. (2014), supra note 88.   
 121  Martire et al. (2013), supra note 26.   
 122  The same problems arise when examiners “identify” items as having the same source 
based, in part, on consideration of the prior odds (a process that I called “identification without 
THOMPSON(DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2018  1:18 PM 
810 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:773 
of this kind should even be admissible is a question evidence scholars should 
consider, given the danger that testimony of this type will invade the 
province of the trier-of-fact and the potential for confusion and double-
counting that arises when the expert’s conclusion rests (to an extent that may 
be unclear) on evidence the trier-of-fact will also consider, and may view 
differently.123  If forensic scientists continue to present source probabilities, 
they should develop standards for disclosure of the examiner’s underlying 
assumptions or evaluations about the prior odds, so that recipients will have 
a clearer understanding of the basis for these conclusions. 
There are many possible alternatives to reporting “identification” or 
source probabilities, some of which require presenting numbers (LRs and 
RMPs) and some of which involve qualitative statements (about strength-of-
support or likelihood of correspondence).  Experts can reach these 
conclusions based solely on evaluation of the physical features of the items 
being compared, without making assumptions about the prior odds of a 
common source, so these approaches avoid the foundational problems of 
source probabilities.  Of course, questions can and should be raised about the 
validity of these conclusions.  When these conclusions rest on databases and 
statistical models, the appropriateness of the databases and the validity of the 
models must be considered.  When these conclusions rest on subjective 
assessment of the relevant likelihoods, serious questions should be asked 
about how accurately examiners can make the necessary subjective 
assessments.  We need thoughtful analysis of such questions in order to 
decide what forensic scientists should be allowed to say about source 
conclusions in reports and testimony. 
The PCAST report suggested that forensic scientists validate subjective 
methods by conducting black-box studies to determine their accuracy.124  
Examiners could then explain the probative value of their conclusions by 
presenting data on true and false positive rates.  For example, a latent print 
examiner could report “identification” of a particular suspect as the source 
of a latent print, but would then say, for example, that the rate of false 
identifications could be as high as 1 in 306 based on error rate data from 
black-box studies.125  The introduction of error rate data changes the nature 
 
uniqueness).   
 123  I am aware of no cases in which litigants have raised foundational challenges to such 
testimony, but that may reflect a failure of lawyers and judges to appreciate that such 
conclusions require examiners to make assumptions or take positions on matters beyond their 
scientific expertise.  Acceptance of such testimony may well diminish once lawyers and 
judges come to appreciate the problematic nature of the underlying logic.   
 124  According to the PCAST report, latent print examination is the only forensic discipline 
for which appropriate black-box studies currently exist.   
 125  There will inevitably be controversy about the exact numbers examiners use to report 
error rates.  A false identification rate of 1 in 306 is PCAST’s calculation of the upper 95% 
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of examiner’s report from a straightforward, unqualified statement that the 
same-source hypothesis is true, to a statement that the examiner has made a 
determination that is diagnostic, in a probabilistic manner, of whether the 
same-source hypothesis is true.  Reports in this form would better meet the 
first criterion of being justified logically and empirically. 
The second criterion for determining how forensic scientists should 
present source conclusions is whether the reported conclusions will be 
understood and used appropriately.  As forensic scientists contemplate the 
possibility of shifting from traditional reporting formats (e.g., 
“identification,” source probabilities) to alternatives (e.g., LRs, strength-of-
support statements), questions will inevitably arise about lay reaction to 
alternative reporting formats.  The research reviewed here should allay 
concerns that people will dismiss or give little weight to statements about 
LRs, strength of support, match frequency or likelihood of correspondence.  
The alternative formats can be influential.  Whether people will give such 
statements the correct weight, however, is a much harder question about 
which there remains much uncertainty. 
Over the past few years, it has become increasingly clear that fallacious 
interpretation of forensic science testimony can have important 
consequences.  Hence, it is important to look for ways to avoid these errors.  
For example, it is worth considering Professor Friedman’s suggestion that 
judges provide explicit, detailed instructions on this issue.126  In some cases 
there may also be a need for expert testimony to explain to the jury what 
would and would not be a proper inference from forensic science evidence.  
While expert testimony on this topic might be resisted as an effort to tell 
jurors how to think, the social science evidence suggests that on this issue 
they may need the help. 
If efforts to educate jurors (and lawyers) about these errors prove 
fruitless, as Professor Spellman fears,127 we will then need to consider 
whether it makes sense to avoid presenting forensic science findings in ways 
that are conducive to these errors.  That might mean avoiding quantitative 
likelihood ratios and random match probabilities, although careful thought 
should be given to whether the disease is sufficiently serious to warrant such 
 
confidence bound of the false identification rate in the largest black-box study of latent print 
examiners.  See supra note 81.  For additional commentary on error rate estimation in forensic 
science, see PCAST REPORT, supra note 15; Nat’l Comm. on Forensic Sci., Views of the 
Commission: Facilitating Research on Laboratory Performance, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & 
NIST (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/909311/download; 
Jonathan J. Koehler, Forensics or Fauxrensics? Ascertaining Accuracy in the Forensic 
Sciences, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1369 (2018).   
 126  Richard D. Friedman, Controlling the Jury-Teaching Function, 48 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 815 (2018).   
 127  Spellman, supra note 26.   
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a drastic cure.  That will depend, of course, on whether there are alternative 
presentation methods that work better—which we can only assess if we have 
yet more research on lay reactions to forensic evidence.  For researchers 
interested in these issues, there is much more work to be done. 
In an ideal world, forensic examiners would always present their 
findings in a manner that causes people to respond to the evidence in a 
manner commensurate with its probative value.  If those receiving the 
evidence gave it too much, or too little weight, the reporting format could be 
tweaked to correct the problem.  Forensic scientists would report their 
findings in the format that assured the best calibration between the probative 
value of the evidence and lay reactions to the evidence. 
We are a long way from that ideal world, but I hope this Article 
provided some glimpses of what that world might look like and how we 
might move toward it.  First, we need much better information about the 
probative value of the forensic identification evidence produced in each 
forensic science discipline.  It would be useful to develop and apply a 
common metric for measuring the probative value of forensic evidence, such 
as a likelihood ratio.  The probative value of a particular conclusion could be 
evaluated by assessing (through research studies) how frequently examiners 
reach that conclusion when comparing items known to be from the same 
source, relative to how frequently they reach that conclusion when 
comparing items known to be from different sources.  The ratio of the two 
frequencies (which is essentially a LR) describes the strength of the evidence 
for proving the items have a common source.  The PCAST report128 and the 
AAAS report on latent print identification129 each include extensive 
discussion of how such studies might be designed and carried out. 
Second, we need more and better research on whether people respond 
to forensic evidence in a manner commensurate with its value, and on how 
their responses vary for different presentation formats.  By combining 
assessment of the probative value of the evidence with assessment of 
people’s reactions to it, we can help assure that responses are properly 
calibrated so that people give the evidence the weight it deserves. 
Consider, for example, how we might evaluate the suitability of the 
reporting statement for latent print evidence proposed by the Defense 
Forensic Science Center of the United States Army.130  We first must 
understand the probative value of this evidence.  That requires data on the 
relative probability that an Army latent print examiner will issue such a 
report after comparing prints made by the same finger, and after comparing 
 
 128  Supra note 15.   
 129  Supra note 15.   
 130  See supra note 42 and accompanying text.   
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prints made by different fingers.  The ratio of these two probabilities is a 
likelihood ratio (LR) that can be used to describe the probative value of the 
conclusion for proving the prints come from the same finger.  We need to 
know roughly the magnitude of this LR—is it 100, 1000, 10,000 or more?  
We cannot determine whether people are responding appropriately to the 
Army’s latent print evidence, after hearing the proposed reporting statement, 
until we know how much weight this evidence deserves. 
The second step is to assess the weight that people give to the evidence, 
using the kind of research discussed in this Article.  If we determine that a 
LR of 1000 describes the probative value of this evidence, then we can assess 
whether people think the reporting statement is as strong as reports about 
other evidence with a LR of 1000, and whether they update their beliefs after 
hearing this evidence in a manner logically commensurate with evidence of 
that value. 
We are not yet able to make the kind of evaluation just described, but 
we have already taken some substantial steps toward that imagined future.  I 
hope this Article will help guide us closer to that goal. 
 
 
